After Stuxnet: The new rules of cyberwar

Critical infrastructure providers face a rising tide of increasingly sophisticated and potentially destructive attacks.

By , Computerworld |  Security, cyberwar, Stuxnet

"There is a need for American industry to be plugged into some of the most secretive elements of the U.S. government -- people who can advise them in a realistic way of what it is that they need to be concerned about," says Hayden. Risks must be taken on both sides so everyone has a consistent view of the threats and what's going on out there.

One way to do that is to share some classified information with selected representatives from private industry. The House of Representatives recently passed an intelligence bill, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, which would give security clearance to officials of critical industry operators. But the bill has been widely criticized by privacy groups, which say it's too broad. Given the current political climate, Hayden says he expects the bill to die in the Senate.

Information sharing helps, and standards form a baseline for protection, but ultimately, every critical infrastructure provider must customize and differentiate its security strategy, Amoroso says. "Right now, every business has exactly the same cybersecurity defense, usually dictated by some auditor," he says. But as in football, you can't win using just the standard defense. A good offense will find a way around it. "You've got to mix it up," Amoroso says. "You don't tell the other guys what you're doing."

Cyberdefense Strategies

Should the U.S. Strike Back?

Most best practices on dealing with cyberattacks on critical infrastructure focus on defense: patching vulnerabilities and managing risk. But should the U.S. conduct preemptive strikes against suspected attackers -- or at least hit back?

Gen. Michael Hayden, principal at security consultancy The Chertoff Group, and former director of the NSA and the CIA, says the cybersecurity problem can be understood through the classic risk equation: Risk (R) = threat (T) x vulnerability (V) x consequences (C). "If I can drive any factor down to zero, the risk goes down to zero," he says. So far, most efforts have focused on reducing V, and there's been a shift toward C, with the goal of determining how to rapidly detect an attack, contain the damage and stay online. "But we are only now beginning to wonder, how do I push T down? How do I reduce the threat?" Hayden says. "Do I shoot back?"

The DOD is contemplating the merits of "cross-domain" responses, says James Lewis, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "We might respond with a missile. That increases the uncertainty for opponents."


Originally published on Computerworld |  Click here to read the original story.
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