November 10, 2010, 1:48 PM — Despite the best precautions, it is impossible to protect your network against every attack. When the inevitable happens, your log data can be critical for identifying the cause of the breach and collecting evidence for use in the legal system. That is, if your logs were properly configured before the breach happened.
Log files are generated by all data processing equipment every time an activity takes place. It is an electronic fingerprint with an added element: we know at what time that fingerprint was generated, so we are able to reconstruct what happened and in what order. Analyzing logs is the primary way of doing forensics, and properly managed logs can also be used as evidence in a court of law for prosecution purposes.
When you enable logs you can typically specify: 1) the severity level, which essentially specifies how severe the event needs to be to deserve creating a log message and 2) the level of detail captured in the log message, the so-called verbose level.
There are eight standard severity levels, from high-severity level 0 (called emergency, in which only emergency and extremely critical events are logged) to low-severity level 7 (called debug, in which almost any minute event is logged).
Verbose levels are less standards and vary on the vendors, makes and models of equipments.
The tradeoffs are obvious:
High severity, low verbose level:
* Few messages; each message is short.
* Little storage requirement, but you won't know much about what happened.
Low severity, low verbose level:
* Many messages; each message is short.
* Medium storage requirement and you will know when something happens, but you won't know much about what happened.
High severity, high verbose level:
* Few messages; each message is long.
* Medium storage requirement and you will be able to tell a lot about critical events but there's many events in which you'll have no visibility at all.
Low severity, high verbose level:
* Many messages, each message is long.
* High storage requirements but you'll know a lot about any event happening.
The right approach is to apply a risk-management method to your logs. As such, you identify the set of systems that are important for you to keep logs from.
Indeed, it is not necessary to have a one-size-fits-all approach to severity/verbose; instead, you want to crank up the number and level of verbose of logs for important systems and dial it down for non-important systems.
We recommend creating four groups of systems, each corresponding to a category of severity/verbose level described above, and apply a different level of logging to each category.