Parties as yet unidentified, for example, may have hacked RSA earlier this year to get data they then used to gain entry to servers at a Lockheed Martin data center in Gaithersburg, Md. through a VPN, and attempted to access both information on customers and Lockheed's own projects – design information on F-16, F-22 and F-35 fighter jets, naval missile-warfare systems and THAAD missile-defense systems.
Data on the F-35 was reportedly stolen in a 2009 attack as well.
In 2007 part of the Pentagon network serving the defense secretary's office had to be shut down after a successful breach.
If that's not enough, for at least the last five years, China in particular has been wearing down security and to reveal secret data in U.S. military and civilian databases like a hose washing away a sand castle.
Russia has been no slouch, either, though most of the more public attacks seem to be commercially directed by organized crime than for flat-out espionage directed by the government.
(They may simply be more subtle than the Chinese, which has twice been able to get a look at inaccessible Internet traffic by having much of the Internet rerouted through its own servers for a little while. Even in more stealthy mode, the tremendously effective Chinese MO relies on spear-phishing techniques that shouldn't fool a relatively smart 14-year-old, let alone government operatives supposedly trained in sophisticated security techniques such as not giving secret passwords to strangers on the Internet.)
This newest report probably won't be much of an improvement, other than to validate the egos of foreign crackers, who will be Woot!ing each other in non-Western fonts and virtual high-fiving themselves at having been recognized as a threat by the big dogs they don't fear anyway.
The primary foreign-policy implication is to give the U.S. government permission to threaten foreign governments with physical retaliation for digital attacks.